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The God Relationship: The Ethics for Inquiry about the Divine, by Paul K.
Moser. Cambridge University Press, 2017. Pp. xii + 347. $99.99 (hardcover)
JILL HERNANDEZ, University of Texas at San Antonio
At the center of Paul Moser’s ambitious new book is both a desire to get
individuals in communion with the divine and a—well, the—prescription
for how to do so. The desire is not what sets the work apart from a large segment of twentieth-century Christian theistic writers, but Moser’s development of the ethics for the inquiry necessary to have individual communion
with God is unique, and worthy of exploration by philosophers of religion.
The result of Moser’s ethics is, what he calls, “relationship theism,” or a
point of departure from which the human seeks to willingly be convicted by
God to seek out his perfect redemption by participating in “an interpersonal
relationship—the God relationship” (55).
The progression towards the ethics of inquiry required for relationship
theism grows out of Moser’s conception of faith and into a defense of the
existence and nature of God. If faith in God is a key object of inquiry, Moser
suggests in chapter 1 that we need clarity of what “God” means. When
Lewis Carroll quipped about the Snatch, “They sought it with thimbles, they
sought it with care; They pursued it with forks and hope; They threatened its
life with a railway-share; They charmed it with smiles and soap,” Moser thinks
Carroll allegorically depicts the vagueness with which people refer to the
divine today. “God” is a title attributable to perfection, and so requires an
invocation of worship. As it turns out, the use of “perfection” for Moser
is metaphysically and morally thick. If God is real (and, the book builds
towards the conclusion that we ought to seek an experience of God’s reality in our own lives), then the perfection of God contains a rich set of
predicates, including that: God is sui generis in moral character (9, 13),
God wants inquirers to know that God is perfect (9), God is morally perfect self-sufficiently (12), God requires imitatio Dei of humans who want a
koinonia relationship with God (9), God is a personal agent (118–119), God
has definite purposes in supplying evidence of divine reality to humans
and self-authenticates to humans (10) but is not required to self-authenticate to all humans at any particular time (13), God is worthy of worship
(11), God is praiseworthy (29), and God is supremely authoritative over
all things (75). As an intellectual enterprise, projects like theodicy fail to
demonstrate God’s reasons for allowing evil in the world because they
cannot encapsulate who God fully is. We are limited in our ability to think
about divine perfection, and so are already unable to understand God’s
reasons for what happens in creation. But, far from being a constraint, our
limitations create space for an encounter with God to “seek interpersonal
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relationships of cooperative mutuality or reciprocity, including relationships of freely-given agape between God and humans” (17). Humans are
called to be open and vulnerable to a God-seeking relationship, which requires more than a philosophical “ethics of belief” (in the vein of William
James and W. K. Clifford)—it requires an ethics of inquiry.
Chapter 2 develops the “kind of mutuality and underlying experience”
that biblical faith (i.e., the type Moser thinks supports relational theism)
exemplifies (45). “Mutuality” here is exactly as we would expect: humans
are willing to respond “to an intervention of God in one’s awareness or
experience” (71) by entrusting the self to God, and God initiates personal
interaction with humans in order to correct actions, thoughts, and feelings
and to redeem the lives of those who have relational faith in God. The relationship envisioned by Moser includes traditionally-conceived notions of
Christian hope and agape love, but he is clear that the cost of the relationship for humans is high, and a necessary condition for it is struggle. “The
resolve in question,” he writes, “requires human willingness to die to the
authority of all powers in conflict with God and God’s power, for the sake
of living for just one ultimate personal Power” (75). Each believer who
aspires to relational theism sacrifices self-agency for a koinonia relationship. (Moser uses koinonia from the onset of the book, but never defines it.
Although he sets aside common definitions for some terms—“faith” for
example—for other terms, he invokes them and expects that the reader
knows what he means. By koinonia, Moser simply means “communion”
or fellowship.) When the believer faces her own kenotic moment of selfsacrifice, Moser explains that she has a Christ-like “Gethsemane weakness of yielding one’s own will to God’s perfect will, even in the face of
death” (77). Any who aspires to relational theism must have their own
Gethsemane moment, to face a trial with God. The trial proves God’s moral
character to the person and tests human moral character during obstacles
(28). The trial is “testing for the reality of what God would value most
in moral agents, including in God: their freely having enduring, faithful
compassion toward other people for the sake of good, agape-oriented relationships between those people, even when circumstances are difficult”
(29). Faith that is produced from individual Gethsemanes can, over a lifetime, yield virtues that are indicative of having a relationship with God.
Like Christ, each believer faces an individual trial which results in receiving compassion and redemption from God.
Of course, believers and non-believers alike go through trials without
also understanding that the product of their suffering is divine compassion in their lives. That, Moser contends in chapter 3, is because they do
not have the proper ethical parameters in place to inquire about God. Any
test of faith, or test of whether God is real in a person’s life, “would call for
the ethics for inquiry about God, owing to the importance of responsible
inquiry about God, all things considered” (116). Philosophers are at a disadvantage to establish the scope and content of this particular ethics of
inquiry, because they rely on an argument-based mode of inquiry, rooted

274

Faith and Philosophy

in abstraction, which “can hinder illumination and decision-making regarding questions about God’s existence” (118). Being in a relationship
with God is an existential state of being, rather than an epistemic one, so
inquiries that begin with the question of God’s existence are faulty from
the start. This type of ‘intellectualism’ equivocates between arguments
and evidence, and fails to provide the “distinctive kind of evidence” a
redemptive God would employ to reconcile humanity with God—especially evidence of perfect, redemptive love (120). Since God is not limited
by evidence individuals already have (117), God can use resources beyond argumentation to become available to humans, and to personally offer
redemption to each person (122). As an existential enterprise, the relevant
ethics for inquiry calls for an inquirer to be in a responsible position to receive salient evidence of God’s reality and goodness. Given perfect divine
goodness, we may expect such evidence to be available to humans under
certain morally relevant conditions. God’s availability to humans does not
entail that God be present at all times, to all people, in the same way, but
Moser reminds his audience that the kenotic action of Christ proves God’s
love to humans, shows what is best for all people, and prompts a reciprocating relationship with the divine (167). We should not be surprised that
the divine hides, ducks and dives, and ultimately presents redemptive
love to individuals in a manner which confounds philosophers.
If the ethics of inquiry requires God to show up to each individual,
yet depends upon an experientially-available point of human departure
wherein each person is open to seeing God’s reasons for suffering and
grace, what is left is for the inquirer “to settle firsthand whether he or she is
under divine inquiry, specifically regarding his or her own will relative to
a morally perfect will” (192). In chapter 4, Moser suggests that answering
a call to God’s will requires (what he calls) “evaluative wisdom” as well as
“practical wisdom.” Evaluative wisdom helps the human agent prioritize
among values, and practical wisdom is used to prioritize among actions
(195). He rejects the “wisdom of the world,” or eloquent wisdom, which
“points to human achievement in a way that would ignore or diminish the
importance of what God has done for humans, particularly in Christ, the
true wisdom of God” (204–205). Whereas eloquent wisdom depends upon
intellectualism for its success to show what is valuable, generally monotheistic (but specifically Christian) evaluative wisdom helps the agent
resist speculative arguments and bear witness to the redemptive power
and wisdom of God. Where does the believer receive assurance of redemption and imputation of wisdom? From the Spirit. There is an “intersubjective pledge” that comes from the Spirit, which transcends the individual
barriers of experience, background, and even a PhD. in philosophy that
threaten our ability to know divine grace. “Divine assurance would come
courtesy of God’s Spirit (that is, God self-manifesting and self-interpreting
action),” Moser writes, “but not just as testimony. It would come by God’s
‘pouring into our hearts,’ that is, our volitional centers as agents, the same
love from God that was self-manifested in the crucified and risen Christ”
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(211). What is felt by agents who receive this love then allows for cognitive grace to take shape, “an epistemology of grace in divine salvation of
humans” (211). The ethics of inquiry inspired by divine assurance results
in certitude—an interpersonal affirmation from God, rather than epistemic
certainty—which confirms that we have an irreducible first-person experience of the divine (230).
The critic might contend that we could never rightly suppose that there
is a divine will, or to suspect that God’s will is directed towards humanity
in a way that is meaning-making for humans. It is true, Moser agrees, that
our own “uncooperative attitudes” and lack of “sympathetic cooperation”
with God’s will can make it seem as though God’s will is hidden (when
it isn’t) or opaque (when it ought not to be). Chapter 5 provides Moser’s
roadmap to those among us who are chronically lost to discover the divine
purpose for redemption and to solve our inability to sympathetically cooperate with God’s will. An ethics of inquiry compels us to inquire responsibly
about God, and to put ourselves in a position to receive salient evidence
and meaning, which could mean that we have to be open to relinquishing our own priorities (255). Responsible inquiry yields to the presenting
evidence of God’s power and love in one’s life, rather than any need to have
evidence. Presenting evidence demonstrates what God has done to transform a believer’s life. And this is the crux of the God-relationship: beliefs
do not transform lives, but relationships do. A relationship with God provides
the experiencer with power and love that cannot be explained by a mere
belief that God exists. That makes the experiencer a witness to divine love,
and then her own life serves as a defense of faith in God, “an opportunity
to witness similarly for the sake of a defense of faith in God, that is, a defense of its veracity or its evidential groundedness regarding God’s actual
involvement” (308). Theodicy as a philosophical exercise suffers for its
commitment to abstract logical problems, but a “witness-based defense”
can testify more strongly to the self-manifestation of God in human experience (309). Serving as witnesses to God’s power and presence in our
individual lives places the question of God’s reality squarely at the feet of
each person (331).
The book’s ambition is in part derived from its pursuit of attracting
readership across disciplines and theological commitments. There is, indeed, content that any scholar who has considered theodicy, the nature
of God, and the response to evil will find insightful and a platform for
further dialogue. Towards that end, I offer a few small points to consider,
with the caveat that the book raises many more. (Two parenthetical notes
may interest readers, both of which surely are intentional, and are raised
without comment. Moser does not invoke a pronoun for God in the book,
even when quoting scripture. The second is, as I point out in the first sentence of this review, Moser does not frame his view as an ethics for the
inquiry of a relationship with the divine, but the ethics for inquiry.)
As for critical issues, the first is directed at the highly-individualistic
ethics that is posited in the text. Moser, without equivocation, develops
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an ethics that only requires the experiencer and God. He is clear about the
individual nature of the ethics—he grounds it in Kierkegaard’s claim that
the individual is the main point of the God relationship (8) and carries the
tune throughout the book. There are several striking consequences of this
view. Moser would have it that individuals come to faith in God, which requires the ethics of inquiry coupled with the right vulnerability and openness to the divine, but such individualism is discordant with the seeming
brokenness of humanity. If those who have a need of faith are already
immoral, without moral character, and broken, how are they, individually,
to follow the ethics of inquiry to discover the divine? It seems much more
likely that a collective group of individuals (a church?) would demonstrate the love and power of God by meeting the needs of the community
around it and thereby bring others into faith. Also, Moser’s commitment to
individualism favors a very small segment of Christian theology after the
twentieth century, and (despite Moser’s contentions otherwise) is wildly
inconsistent with, for example, Judaism and other Christian traditions, in
which corporate inquiry into the holy texts is much more valuable than an
individual pursuit.
Ethicists will correctly identify logical problems with Moser’s argument about why moral predicates should pertain to God, “If God is
praiseworthy, as many people hold, then God would make praiseworthy
choices about divine conduct . . . and would deserve credit for choosing to
be perfectly good, and this credit would acknowledge God’s free choice
in favor of what is good in action” (29). Finally, Moser’s ethics of inquiry
has an inescapable demandingness problem. The poor unbeliever! It isn’t
enough to use “reason”—reason separates a person from the experiential
love and power of God—to come to the divine, it isn’t enough to poke,
and prod, and raise questions. Instead, they have to have a right belief
(that God exists), from the right source (God choosing to show God to the
individual), in the right relationship (reciprocally with God, because of
the person of Jesus Christ, through the Spirit), through the right manner
(morally, through the ethics of inquiry). That the inquirer needs to be in a
responsible position to receive salient evidence of God’s goodness seems
to have the odd result that relational theism demands a right relationship
of the person most disadvantaged to pursue it—the seeking atheist.

